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Abstract
Network forensics and Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) have ultimately become so important to
corporations that in many cases they have been relied upon to identify the actions of offenders and to provide
sufficient details to prosecute them. Unfortunately, as data links on corporate networks have increased to
saturation, more information is being missed and even though corporations have spent heavily acquiring loud,
power hungry devices to monitor their networks. A more power efficient solution, which consumes less
electricity, yet provides the same or better packet inspection is an obvious solution.. This paper discusses a
possible solution using a cluster of Raspberry Pis, a credit card sized computer valued at AUD$40 each. These
tiny devices (whilst individually are limited in power and bandwidth) can be clustered together with economic
benefits. This multi-GPU environment can inspect more data and therefore log more information for
investigators. Overall it offers easier maintenance and therefore can be kept up to date easier. Finally clustering
many of these devices may provide corporations with a better understanding as to what is occurring on their
networks at a cheaper on-going cost.
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INTRODUCTION
Modern society has become dependent on the Internet to such a degree that our love for data sees many people
using the Internet at home, on the way to and from work, and at work itself.
Only last year Facebook advised it had surpassed one billion users, Apple announced it had 50 billion
downloads from their app store, and Google stated they had half a billion active accounts (Abrahamsson, 2013)
As a result of Internet activity, a security expert, Marcus Ranum, first introduced the idea of network forensics
in the 90’s (Ranum, 1998). His idea was to have the ability to capture or record the network, and later analyse
the data so as to discover the source of any security breach. But how much traffic needs to be recorded to be
useful?
Historically it was easy for a network investigator to capture everything, store it all and quickly look through the
data to find suspicious information and port usage. At the time, there were limited users and very separate
protocols and almost no encryption used. However, as data usage has increased and a standardisation for the
majority of applications to use the HTTP protocol for transmission, the ease for investigators to review relevant
information has reduced and therefore increased the number of man-hours (Mazurczyk, 2014)
The growing use of cloud computing, encryption and the movement to Bring Your Own Devices (BYODs) has
also brought with it a number of challenges to investigators. For example, how can an investigator find relevant
information relating to an incident, if all of the data has been encrypted and transferred from a mobile device? If
this data now resides outside the corporate network, in a foreign country, what legal capability does the
company have to investigate what information has potentially fallen into the hands of competitors?
Botnets and the use of the dark web are additional areas of concern for corporations. These computers may be
compromised internal computers, which have unknowingly joined a network and can be remotely controlled.
Many of these networks use sophisticated encryption, require minimal amounts of network traffic and attempt to
blend their activity in with normal traffic on the network. How can a modern network investigator track this
activity and ensure it can be detected, stopped from further infestation, and prevented in the future?
With the multitude of viruses, worms and trojans present on the Internet, the cost to the organisation to keep the
corporations infrastructure secure and to reduce possible infestation, far outweighs the cost associated should an
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outbreak occur within the organisation (Nguyen, 2004). However, it is also easy to be of the mindset that a
firewall or IDS is a catch all, leave and forget device, when in fact many constantly need updates and
maintenance.
Network forensics is becoming increasingly important for these reasons, but as a result, intelligence also
becomes a fundamental aspect. If we can ensure that sensors on the network are highly tuned and use the latest
information from other corporations, there will be a higher chance that any indicators of attack are picked up
and a lower chance of a “true-negative” result and filter out possible deceptive data (Gupta, 2003)

CURRENT CHALLENGES
Currently, many organisations take the same old approach installing Network Intrusion Detection Systems
(NIDS): The server is installed at the egress and ingress points to the network (Bellovin, 2002). These links are
typically the fastest links, which also carry the majority of the corporation’s data. As a result, fast but expensive
and power hungry machines are utilised in an attempt to keep up.
Unfortunately, monitoring every packet is virtually impossible for these individual devices without creating
either a delay in traffic delivery or a bottleneck (Schaelicke, 2005). Additionally, should a Denial of Service
(DoS) attack occur, the device attempting to monitor all traffic, could in fact be the weakest point in the
network. This could subsequently cause a network outage as it attempts to carry out its duties.
Therefore NIDS typically only conducts dip samples of the traffic. The frequency of these samples is based on
the load of the NIDS system, the speed of the processor, the network speed and the network utilisation.
(Schaelicke, 2005)
Monitoring the network based on the egress and ingress points alone also does not sufficiently detect the
possibility of an internal attack. This type of attack may never transmit via those data collection points. For this
reason, monitoring should be conducted irrespective of the collection point.
Additionally, as many as many of these devices generate substantial heat, dedicated cooling and power filtration
systems are required. This means all data must transit the same data links, to the same data centre where the
NIDS devices are located, potentially causing locations for network congestion and single points of failure. This
single device also causes issues for administrators attempting to keep the device updated. Also, having a single
device does not allow any testing of new software.
Capturing relevant data is another challenge to the investigator, particularly when dealing with high volumes of
data. In many instances the investigator unfortunately is frustrated the ultimate evidence is unobtainable – a full
packet capture of everything that occurred. As a result, many investigations have been reliant on artifacts of
communication, which do provide an insight into what has occurred, however come from a myriad of devices
including routers, firewalls, proxy servers and access logs for services. This results in large log files and
difficulty interpreting what has occurred (Bai, 2013).
The question therefore is how to capture the relevant amount of data without capturing too little or too much and
how do we know what is relevant and what’s irrelevant?
Ideally, the attack type will dictate how much information we may wish to capture. In the case of a Denial Of
Service (DOS) attack do we really need to capture every single packet from every single host? Or is it better to
detect the attack and protect assets? In the case of a trial, should an expert witness be called to court, the chances
of the court discussing every single packet is therefore minimal. I suggest the court would be rather interested in
the total number of packets and how this was detrimental to the company.
However, in the case unauthorised access of a computer (section 440A Criminal Code of Western Australia)
(Government, 2003) times and dates of access and what they did, including all commands, maybe extremely
relevant to prove beyond reasonable doubt, how the offender gained access and what they did once they were
inside. Section 440A also requires that the system was a secure system and therefore does not have an easily
guessed password (such as ‘password’) in order for successful prosecution.
An alternative solution would allow a cluster of computers, which don’t care where the sample points are
located. Effectively any computer can be linked into a cluster and purport to serve the requirements of the
service previously discussed, however it’s been found that companies are now consistently looking for more
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energy-efficient servers, often using low-power CPUs (Cox, 2013) (Rohr, 2011) (Abrahamsson, 2013).

A MORE COST EFFECTIVE SOLUTION
Many of the problems discussed maybe resolved by a small device, which was traditionally marketed towards
the hobbyist user.
The Raspberry Pi is a credit-sized computer, which contains a 700Mhz ARM processor and either 256 or 512mb
of RAM. The devices can run on a 5V 1A DC current, making it possible to link multiple devices into a
standard computer power supply (Kiepert, 2013). As there are no moving parts and a small footprint, the cooling
requirements for these devices are significantly cheaper to that of commercial servers.
Whilst the Raspberry Pi may lack resources, such as the ability to use gigabit Ethernet connections (only having
a 100Mps network interface) clustering multiple devices would still allow more data to be interpreted to that of
a single NIDs system. Further development in the near future may also find the Raspberry Pi to include a gigabit
or faster Ethernet port, similar to other products like the Banana Pi, along with more memory and processing
power (Powell, 2014)
The University of Southampton recently commissioned a super computer comprising of 64 Raspberry Pi nodes;
64 processors, 1 TB of memory and cost under AUD $4500 (Cox, 2013). The devices were individually
powered by mobile phone chargers and racked using just Lego blocks. The systems ran Raspbian Operating
system under a Message Passing Interface (MPI) to distribute the workload amongst the 64 nodes.
Large multimode clusters using this device have been used in amazing technical breakthroughs including but
not limited to Beowulf Clusters to tackle engineering challenges (Cox, 2013), Cloud based servers for the
purpose of different services/applications (Kiepert, 2013) and clusters to search the skies for meteors (Norman,
2013).
Traditional servers contain large arrays of spinning disk platters and fast access RAM. These traditional
spinning disk platters are known for their slow seek times whilst large volumes of RAM require vast amounts of
power to be useful. The costs associated with purchasing these large servers can run into the tens of thousands
of dollars per unit. A Raspberry Pi cluster on the other hand does not require spinning disks, large volumes of
ram and is substantially cheaper than a traditional server (Cox, 2013).
Recent projects have also found easy and cheap ways in which the Raspberry Pi can be mounted in a fashion
which maximizes space (Kiepert, 2013), similarly discussion has launched with the possibility of mounting a
large number of Raspberry Pi computers into a single 1U rack mount case.
Projects have also found the maintenance of the Raspberry Pi cluster can be completed using a central
repository or as simple as changing out an SD card (Abrahamsson, 2013) (Andersen, 2011). This in turn causes
a saving in man-hours spent maintaining servers and large infrastructure.
Each Raspberry Pi device can also be removed from the cluster, updated and reconnected, this could not be
possible with a single device. To save further time, a remote update command could also be used to update all
nodes automatically.
The ability to remove a node from the cluster also affords the administrators the ability to test software updates
to ensure there’s no software problems or conflicts. This ability would not be possible with a single device,
without downtime and loss of potential evidence.
Additionally networks with more sampling sample points raise the ability for the clusters to capture more
information. The Raspberry Pi cluster would therefore be able to capture more of the conversation of an attack.
Unfortunately as the Raspberry Pi is limited in the hard drive space, a disk node would be required for the
purpose of a central repository for logging and data retention.
To prevent this disk node becoming a single point of failure, a multimode environment is recommended. This
allows another disk node to take over, in the event of hardware failure. The linux Distributed Replicated Block
Device (DRBD) project has matured to a standard, which has seen the software make its way into commercial
and production environments (Ellenberg, 2007). This software is more than capable to allow the Raspberry Pi
cluster to record relevant information as well as schedule downtime and maintenance on a disk node, should it

111

be required.
Finally the open source community has already developed many tools, which analyse multiple streams of data,
graph as well as report on what happened, how it happened and for how long. As an example the logstash
project has developed an open source tool, which quickly allows the investigator to parse logs, index, search and
graph the results (Borouchaki, 2009).
In the case of a defacement of a website, the centralised logging server allows the corporation to report on
typical network usage. This allows the investigator to create statistical reports, for court purposes, as to how
many people saw the defacement and how much it cost the company in lost revenue.
A constant challenge to the security professional is to demonstrate to management how much money has been
saved, by purchasing a security device. As the cluster has the ability to report on overall utilisation as well as
possible attack vectors, a graphical representation could be incorporated which allows management to easily see
thwarted attacks.
Graphical representations have also been discussed with regards to network and security administrators as an
easier way to manage their networks and detect anomalies (Harrop, 2004). Should graphical representations be
incorporated with the reporting mechanisms earlier discussed, it could easily reveal overall problems with the
network, which are otherwise shadowed by complexity.

CONCLUSION
Network forensics is a complex task, which can be aided by a collection of simple, cheap and effective devices,
however it is not without its challenges.
Each single device is somewhat slower than a standard desktop computer and extremely slow to that of a large
industrial server or edge protection device currently utilised by corporations. The cluster of devices also requires
regular updates to each of the cluster nodes to ensure they’re aware of current heuristics and signatures, which
may signify a possible attack.
As the Raspberry Pi is limited to the size of an SD card, it potentially lacks the storage capacity to capture large
streams of data without filling to capacity. Network storage devices or disk nodes using open source, high
availability software would be required to alleviate this problem.
However, despite these challenges, we have already seen many projects linking these devices together to form a
cluster with substantial power savings and significant processing returns. The reduced carbon footprint, lower
use of power and memory and ease of for updates makes these devices an attractive solution to corporations. It
is only natural they find their way into greater applications, such as clusters discussed in this paper, as their
software and hardware matures. Many projects have already addressed the issues of load balancing, logging and
maintenance discussed.
Also there are other free solutions available in the open source community, which would address the issues
regarding storage and reporting of attacks. Significant advantages exist to this cluster environment in
comparison to a single NIDs or several expensive servers.
Ultimately the challenges are achievable and the device offers the ability to sample more data, at reduced
running costs and initial outlay. It presents the network forensic investigator a chance to intelligently reconstruct
the series of events, by capturing more data, accurately.
Finally and importantly in cases where a breach has occurred and where charges have been preferred, the
investigator is afforded a better opportunity to discover what occurred. This ultimately can be communicated to
the court, in absolute certainty and lead to a conviction.

REFERENCES
Abrahamsson, P. (2013). Affordable and Energy-Efficient Cloud Computing Clusters: The Bolzano Raspberry
Pi Cloud Cluster Experiment. CloudCom, IEEE, 2(1), 170-172.
Andersen, D. G., Franklin, J., Kaminsky, M., Phanishayee, A., Tan, L., Vasudevan V. (2011). Fawn: fast array

112

of wimpy nodes. ACM, 54(7)(2011), 101-109. doi: 10.1145/1965724.1965747
Bai, J. (2013). Feasibility analysis of big log data real time search based on Hbase and ElasticSearch. ICNC,
1166 - 1170. doi: 10.1109/ICNC.2013.6818154
Bellovin, S. M., Cheswick, W. R. (2002). Network Firewalls. IEEE C. M., 32(9), 50-57. doi: 10.1109/35.312843
Borouchaki, H. (2009). XpoLog enhances logstash with Augmented Search. Journal of Engineering (Atlanta,
Ga), 64.
Cox, S. J., Cox J.T., Boardman R.P., Johnston S.J., Scott M. (2013). Iridis-pi: a low-cost, compact
demonstration cluster. Cluster Computing, 17(2), 349-358. doi: 10.1007/s10586-013-0282-7
Ellenberg, L. (2007). DRBD 8.0.x and beyond Shared-Disk semantics on a Shared-Nothing Cluster. LinuxConf
Europe.
Government, W. A. (2003). Criminal Code Act Compilation Act. State Law Publisher. Gupta, N. (2003).
Determining the effectiveness of deceptive honeynets.
Harrop, W., Armitage, G. (2004). Intuitive Real-Time Network Monitoring Using Visually Orthogonal 3D
Metaphors. ATNAC.
Kiepert, J. (2013). Creating a Raspberry Pi-Based Beowulf Cluster
Mazurczyk, W., Szczypiorski K., Hui T. (2014). Network forensics and challenges for cybersecurity. annals of
telecommunications - annales des télécommunications, 69(7-8), 345-346. doi: 10.1007/s12243-0140434-7
Nguyen, J. (2004). The impact of Microsoft Windows infection vectors on IP network traffic patterns. CAIA
Technical Report 040804A.
Norman, M. (2013). Meteor Raspberry Pi cluster to teach parallel computing. NH&S, 150.
Powell, M. (2014). Redesign for barebones Raspberry Pi computer. ANM 2014, 1(1)
Ranum, M. (1998). Experiences Benchmarking Intrusion Detection Systems. Network Flight Recorder
Rohr, D., Bach, M., Kretz, M., Lindenstruth V. (2011). Multi-GPU DGEMM and high performance linpack on
highly energy-efficient clusters. Micro, IEEE, 31(5), 18-27. doi: 10.1109/MM.2011.66
Schaelicke, L., Freeland, J. C. (2005). Characterizing Sources and Remedies for Packet Loss in Network
Intrusion Detection Systems. IEEE WCS 2005, 1(1), 188-196. doi: 10.1109/IISWC.2005.1526016

113

